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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JOSEPH ANTHONY SLATTERY, 
Defendant/Appellant, 
Case No. 20020769-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count of 
aggravated assault, a third degree felony (R. 1-3). This court 
has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2) (e) (2002) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Can defendant prevail on his claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel where he enjoyed no better probability of a 
different trial outcome even if his counsel had objected to the 
testimony defendant asserts should not have been admitted? 
In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
this Court must determine whether trial counsel's performance was 
deficient and, if so, whether the deficient performance 
prejudiced defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687 (1984); State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 32, 1 20, 984 P.2d 376 
(citations omitted). If it is easier to do so, the reviewing 
court may dispose of such a claim on the ground of no prejudice. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. Ineffective assistance presents a 
question of law, reviewed on the record of the underlying trial. 
See State v. Hovater, 914 P.2d 37, 39 (Utah 1996)(citing State v. 
Humphries, 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991)). 
2. When viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict, was the evidence sufficient to support the verdict? 
A criminal conviction based on a jury verdict will be 
reversed for insufficient evidence only when the evidence is "so 
inconclusive or so inherently improbable that ^reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt' that the defendant 
committed the crime." State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 
1994)(quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
No constitutional provision, statute, or rule is dispositive 
in this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count of aggravated assault, 
a third degree felony (R. 3-5). He was tried by a jury and 
convicted as charged (R. 102, 138-39). The trial court sentenced 
him to a suspended term of zero-to-five years in the Utah State 
Prison and a $5000 fine. The court also ordered him to serve 6C 
days in the Salt Lake County jail and 24 months on probation, pay 
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a $7 50 fine, and comply with a variety of conditions (R, 1 1 2 ) , 
D e f e n :i a n t f :i ] e ::i a 1: :i i i: L • = J ] i i D 1: :i :: e o f a p p e a ] (P " • 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 1 
Rachel Velasquez, the victim in th i s :ase, clocked • :>ut from 
her job as a Walmart cashier at: exactly midnight oi i Saturday, 
October 13th of 2 001 (I 1 3S 7 2- 7 3 ) . She walked out the front 
d o o r : f 1:1 I = s 1: : r = J « : :: a t e d a 1: 5 '! 0 0 S • : • i 11:1: I a i I • :i R e d w c: : :i R • D a :i :t 
over to her car, whi i:h was parked "pretty much by itself, " : 
a r e a n e a r 11 I = :j a r d e r I :: e n t e i: 11: I a 1: * a s i i : t: =; i \ \ i a ] ] ] :i t ( , 
R. 138: 72- 73, 75) . She got: :i i i her car, closed the door, 
fastened her seatbelt, and inserted the key in the ignition 
at: ; 5, 1 26) . - • . 
R a c h e 1 t h e n h e a r d a k n o c k o n the d r i v e r' s s i d e w i n d • :> w, 
W :i 11: I • : • i I t: 1 o o k i i I g, s 1 I e o p e i I e d 11: I e :i : • D r a b • : i 11 1 8 :i i i • :: .1: I € s ( I • i , a t: ; 5, 
; 7 ] 2 7) Standing there was a man with dark, shoulder-length 
1 i a :i r a „ i I :i a b r : \ i: I s :: r a g g J ; , I: E; a i: :i, w a a r :i i I g a b a ] ] : a p a r i :i p J a :i • :I 
f1anne1 jacket (Id. at 7 5- 7 6) . He said he needed he1p jump-
starting his truck ( Id. at 7 8 ) , Rachel told him she did not have 
any cables; he responded that he « ±1/ ::i ( I - i. ) , After suggesting 
that he try nearby businesses for help, Rachel realized from, his 
b r e a 11: i 11 ta t 1:1: I = • i i ta i I a s :i rl 11 I k ( I d. a t: ! ' 9) SI I• = t :i : :i a :! 1: • : :: ] :) s e 
the car door, telling the man she could ncvt help, but she was 
unable to do so because he was blocking the doorway ( Id ) . 
1
 The facts are recited in the ligl it most favorable to U le 
jury verdict. See State v. Heaps, 2000 UT 5, 12, 999 P.2d 565. 
^ 3> 
Insisting that she help him, the man moved closer. He then 
stabbed her with an unidentified object on the left side, below 
her armpit (Id. at 79-80). When Rachel began screaming and 
honking her car horn, the man walked away and back to his truck; 
however, he seemed in no rush to get away (Id. at 82-83). 
Rachel immediately drove over to where an acquaintance, 
Scott Molis, was eating a snack in his Blazer, which was towing a 
12-foot trailer loaded with power washing equipment (Id. at 74, 
82, 233-35, 252). She told Scott what had happened, pointed out 
her assailant standing by his truck in the parking lot, and then 
realized she was bleeding (Id. at 83-84, 236). Scott sent the 
frantic young woman inside to call the police and told her he 
would go after the man, whom he described as less-than-average in 
height and build, with dark hair and a scruffy beard, driving a 
'68-'72 powder blue Chevy or Ford truck (IdL. at 84, 161, 235, 
238, 269). Encumbered by the load he was pulling, Scott reached 
within 20 feet of the man's truck, but was ultimately unable to 
catch him as he drove out of the parking lot (Id. at 240-42).2 
Rachel Velasquez testified at trial. Conceding that the 
light in the Walmart parking lot was not good, she openly 
admitted that she was unable, on two different occasions, to 
select defendant's picture from police photo arrays (R. 138: 75, 
2
 The police later presented Scott with a photo array, but 
he was unable to identify defendant. Nonetheless, he testified 
at trial that defendant closely resembled the person in the truck 
he had chased (R. 138: 243-44; R. 139: 383). 
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95, 138, 142, 171). She further conceded that the first time she 
saw defendant up close, which was at the preliminary hearing, she 
was only 50% sure that he was her assailant (Id. at 143, 153). 
She also testified that, after the preliminary hearing, an 
officer took her to see if she could recognize her assailant's 
truck. She immediately noticed that the rear license plate of 
the vehicle the officer showed her was mounted off-center, just 
as she had remembered it from the night of the assault (R. 139: 
579, 582; R. 138: 91, 163). The color was also the same (R. 138 
at 179). Rachel also realized at that time that she had a slip 
of paper in her pocket with the license plate number written on 
it (Id. at 101) . Relying on that number, as well as her 
recollection of the truck's color and off-center license plate, 
she identified the truck as the one her assailant was driving (R. 
139: 587-88) . 
Finally, in her rebuttal testimony, Rachel stated that she 
had never heard defendant's voice until the second day of trial, 
when he took the stand as a witness. She stated: "As soon as I 
heard [defendant's voice], I started shaking, as if I was - that 
night, what happened. I was totally fearful, like I'm still 
shaking inside. It's like my body recognized it" (Id. at 579). 
Rachel experienced this fearful reaction "when [defendant] first 
started talking earlier" (Id.). Asked how sure she was of the 
voice identification, she replied, "I am sure. I had to walk out 
of the room because I almost started crying" (Id. at 580). On 
-5-
cross examination, Rachel told defense counsel, "I didn't even 
think of [feeling fearful towards defendant] until I heard his 
voice" (l£L. at 581) . 
• * • 
A teenager named Jay was leaving Walmart with his mother 
just after midnight, when he heard a girl screaming and realized 
"that's not a girl screaming for fun" (R. 138: 191). Jay saw a 
man leaning into a car, making forward thrusting motions with his 
fist, while the girl tried to get him off of her (Id. at 191-93). 
Jay's mother directed him not to get involved, so Jay stood and 
watched to see what would happen (Id. at 194). As the man walked 
toward his truck, he came to within 20 feet of where Jay and his 
mother were standing. Jay testified that the man was "wobbly" 
and appeared intoxicated, had a beard and very long dark hair, 
wore a plaid shirt, levis, boots, and a baseball cap, and was 
driving a full-size blue Ford or Chevy truck (Id. at 195-96, 209, 
213-14). Jay memorized the truck's license plate number, 378 
KRZ, and wrote it down soon afterwards, when he returned to the 
Walmart to talk to the police (Id. at 196, 226). Jay testified 
at trial that defendant looked like the man who drove off in the 
blue truck (Id. at 202). 
• • • 
Thirty-two minutes after Rachel Velasquez clocked out of 
Walmart, Officer Scott Daniels reported a hit and run accident at 
the Paper Moon bar, located at 3423 South State Street in Salt 
-6-
Lake City3 (IdL. at 279, 281). He stopped the vehicle, an older 
model blue Chevy truck with license number 378 KRZ (Id. at 285-
86). Defendant, the intoxicated driver of the truck, had backed 
into another vehicle, and then tried to leave the scene (Id. at 
279, 306). The police cited defendant for DUI and impounded his 
truck (Id. at 306). Officer Daniels, when asked, did not 
remember anything about what defendant was wearing that night 
(Id. at 287). 
Defendant denied he was at Walmart around midnight, but 
conceded he had so much to drink that night that he could not 
walk and was too drunk to drive. He also admitted that he had 
"tapped" a car in the Paper Moon parking lot (R. 139 at 514, 522, 
536). He insisted that he had been wearing a distinctive court 
jester hat all evening, which he referred to as a "king fool hat" 
(Id. at 523, 535; see Def. Ex. #s 15 & 17). He also testified 
that he was the only person in possession of his truck and truck 
keys that night (R. 139: 340, 548). Defendant's friend and 
drinking buddy, David Gouge, corroborated defendant's alibi in 
all relevant detail. See id. at 407-75. 
After 40 minutes of deliberation, the jury convicted 
defendant, as charged, of aggravated assault (R. 102, R. 140: 6). 
3
 A private investigator for the defense testified that 
driving from Walmart to the Paper Moon at midnight took him 
between 17 and 18 minutes, depending on his choice of route (R. 
139 at 489-91). An investigator for the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff's Office testified that in mid-afternoon the same trip 
took him between 12 and 13 minutes, depending on the route (Id. 
at 346). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant contends he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel because his attorney did not object to the victim's 
identification of him at trial. This claim fails both on the 
deficient performance and prejudice prongs of the relevant 
analysis. The testimony to which defendant objects - a visual 
in-court identification - was, when considered in context, 
equivocal at best. In any event, had it been excluded, defendant 
was still likely to have been convicted. The victim's equivocal 
identification was simply not the linchpin of the case. The most 
persuasive evidence before the jury was the teenager's 
identification of defendant's license plate number at the scene 
of the crime, combined with defendant's own admission that he was 
the only person in possession of his truck or truck keys on the 
night of the assault. Defendant thus suffered no prejudice from 
the deficient performance he alleges. 
Second, the evidence was sufficient to support the 
conviction. Defendant's argument to the contrary ignores the 
jury's role in determining the credibility of the witnesses, 
incorrectly presuming that the jury had to believe the evidence 
mos: favorable to him rather than that presented by the State. 
When the evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict, it was plainly sufficient to support the 
conviction. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FAILS BECAUSE 
HE HAD NO BETTER PROBABILITY OF A 
DIFFERENT TRIAL RESULT EVEN IF THE 
JURY HAD NOT CONSIDERED THE 
TESTIMONY TO WHICH HE OBJECTS 
Defendant argues that his counsel performed deficiently by 
failing to object to Rachel Velasquez's statement that she was 
"sure" defendant was her assailant. He contends that, absent 
this constitutionally unreliable in-court identification by the 
victim, which he contends provided the pivotal link between him 
and the crime, the jury would not have convicted him. See Br. of 
Aplt. at 28-31. 
Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim fails 
both on the deficient performance and prejudice prongs of the 
analysis. However, the law is well-settled that "[i]f it is 
easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of 
lack of sufficient prejudice, . . . that course should be 
followed." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697; accord 
Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 523 (Utah 1994). That is the 
case here,4 
4
 In proceeding directly to the prejudice prong, the State 
does not concede that trial counsel's performance was 
constitutionally deficient. Tthe victim's visual identification 
testimony ranged from two photo-array non-identifications prior 
to trial to an "50% sure" identification at the preliminary 
hearing to a "sure" identification at trial. This testimony, 
considered as a whole, was plainly equivocal and could as easily 
have played in favor of the defense as the prosecution. Because 
-9-
To show prejudice, defendant must carry the burden of 
demonstrating a reasonable probability that he would not have 
been convicted had his counsel objected to the allegedly harmful 
testimony. See State v. Arguelles, 921 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 
1996). Defendant has not met this burden. 
The undisputed evidence at trial established that the 
license plate of the blue truck driven by Rachel Velasquez's 
assailant was 378 KRC (R. 138: 196). The teenager who saw the 
license number gave it to the police on the scene and also wrote 
it down on a piece of paper that Rachel later found in her pocket 
(Id. at 101). Both the victim and the teenager testified that 
the man who assaulted Rachel appeared to be intoxicated (Id. at 
79, 195, 198). Less than half an hour after the assault, an 
officer stopped a blue truck, license number 378 KRC, leaving the 
scene of an accident (Id. at 286). Defendant, the driver, was 
intoxicated (Id. at 283, 306). Defendant himself unequivocally 
maintained that he was the only person in possession of his truck 
and his truck keys on the night of the assault (R. 139: 548). 
In light of this evidence, Rachel's testimony linking 
defendant to the crime was not the linchpin of the case. Indeed, 
the testimony could have been interpreted to support defendant's 
contention that he was not the assailant, defense counsel did not 
perform deficiently by not objecting to it. See State v. 
Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 468 (Utah App. 1993) ("If a rational basis 
for counsel's performance can be articulated[, this Court will 
assume counsel acted competently"). In any event, the jury was 
given a cautionary instruction to guide its consideration of the 
testimony (R. 81-83). 
-10-
wholly apart from the victim's testimony about defendant's 
identity, the evidence before the jury compelled a finding of 
guilt. For this reason, defendant's ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim fails. 
POINT TWO 
WHEN VIEWED IN THE LIGHT MOST 
FAVORABLE TO THE JURY'S VERDICT, 
WITH DEFERENCE TO THE JURY'S 
CREDIBILITY DETERMINATIONS, THE 
EVIDENCE IS CLEARLY SUFFICIENT TO 
SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT 
Defendant argues at length that the evidence was 
insufficient to establish that he was the individual who attacked 
Rachel Velasquez in the Walmart parking lot. See Br. of Aplt. at 
31-45.5 For this argument, defendant relies primarily on the 
victim's inability to identify him from two police photo arrays 
and on inconsistencies between her testimony and that of other 
witnesses. See id. at 23. Defendant argues that the victim's 
weak testimony and the testimony of defendant's alibi witness 
together created a reasonable doubt that he was the perpetrator. 
Id. at 43-45. Defendant also asserts, without citing any legal 
authority, that the teenager's unequivocal license plate 
5
 Defendant also briefly argues that because he could not 
have been at Walmart at the time the attack occurred, his trial 
counsel performed deficiently by failing to move for a directed 
verdict, and the trial court committed plain error by not sua 
sponte refusing to submit the matter to the jury. See Br. of 
Aplt. at 45-47. Because these arguments turn on the sufficiency 
of the evidence, they need not be analyzed apart from that issue 
-11-
identification made "was insufficient to link [defendant] to the 
crime." Id. at 41. 
An appellate court's role in reviewing the sufficiency of 
the evidence following a criminal conviction is limited. State 
v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994). A reviewing court 
will reverse a criminal conviction on insufficiency grounds only 
when the evidence is so lacking that "reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt" that defendant committed the 
crime. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), 
superceded on other grounds, State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 
1987). However, "[w]here there is any evidence, including 
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it, from which 
findings of all the elements of the crime can be made beyond a 
reasonable doubt, our inquiry is complete and we will sustain the 
verdict." State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 285 (Utah 1989). 
Defendant's argument fails because he does not recognize the 
role of credibility in the jury's assessment of the evidence. 
The law is well-settled that "[d]eterminations of witness 
credibility are left to the jury. The jury is free to believe or 
disbelieve all or part of any witness's testimony." State v. 
Haves, 860 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah App. 1993)(citing State v. Jonas, 
793 P.2d 901, 904-05 (Utah App. 1990). And, 
[wjhen the evidence presented is conflicting 
or disputed, the jury serves as the exclusive 
judge of both the credibility of witnesses 
and the weight to be given particular 
evidence. Ordinarily, a reviewing court may 
not reassess credibility or reweigh the 
-12-
evidence, but must resolve conflicts in the 
evidence in favor of the jury verdict. 
State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993) (citations 
omitted). Furthermore, minor inconsistencies or contradictions 
in a witness's testimony will not warrant reversal based on 
insufficient evidence. State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801, 809 (Utah 
App. 1998). 
In this case, defendant's insufficiency argument turns on 
three contentions. First, he argues that Rachel Velasquez's 
testimony was so inconclusive as to necessarily create a 
reasonable doubt that he was the assailant. See Br. of Aplt. at 
40-41. It is true that Rachel admitted that she was unable to 
identify defendant from the two police photo arrays (R. 138: 95, 
138, 142, 171). She also admitted that because she was in shock 
at the time of the attack, she could have been mistaken when she 
told the police that her assailant's truck had a solid tailgate 
(R. 139: 589).6 To this point, Rachel's testimony provides 
little evidence on which a jury could convict defendant. 
On the second day of trial, however, Rachel Velasquez heard 
defendant speak out loud for the first time (Id. at 578). She 
reacted strongly to the sound of his voice, testifying that she 
had an unexpected visceral reaction to it (Id.). Based on an 
immediate recognition of defendant's voice, Rachel then for the 
6
 Other witnesses testified that the truck had a black mesh 
cargo net installed where the tailgate would normally be. See R. 
139: 439, 479-80, 525). 
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first time unequivocally identified defendant as her attacker7 
(Id. at 578, 581) . 
Plainly, the jury exercised its prerogative in weighing the 
credibility of all of Rachel's testimony. State v. Brown, 948 
P.2d 337, 343-44 (Utah 1997). The jury was free to believe 
Rachel's inability to recognize defendant visually, based on the 
poor light in the parking lot and the trauma of the event, as 
well as her unequivocal recognition of defendant's voice when he 
finally spoke up at trial. 
Second, defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient 
to convict him because he was not at Walmart when the attack 
occurred. See Br. of Aplt. at 41-45. Defendant's drinking buddy 
and central alibi witness, David Gouge, presented a detailed 
chronology of defendant's activities on the night of the assault 
at Walmart (R. 139: 424-35, 443-447, 453). Defendant also 
testified to those events. See id. at 506-74. Certainly, had 
the jury believed this testimony and disbelieved all of the 
State's witnesses, it would have acquitted defendant. The 
verdict, however, clearly attests to the fact that it did not 
find defendant or his associate credible, a decision that a 
reviewing court will not revisit. State v. Wright, 893 P.2d 
1113, 1117 (Utah App. 1995). 
7
 Defendant did not object to the admission of this voice 
identification testimony nor did he ask for a cautionary 
instruction on it. 
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Finally, defendant argues without any legal authority that 
the teenager's identification of defendant's license plate in the 
Walmart parking lot is insufficient to establish that defendant 
was the assailant. See Br. of Aplt. at 41. This inadequately-
briefed argument is misguided. Not only did the teenager 
identify defendant's license plate at Walmart, but defendant also 
conceded that he was the only person with access to his truck, 
bearing the same license number, that night. These facts, 
considered in conjunction with the testimony of the victim, the 
power washer, and the officer who ultimately stopped defendant at 
the bar, clearly provide sufficient evidence to support the 
jury's verdict. 
Where, as here, defendant's insufficiency claim "presumes 
that the jury was obligated to believe the evidence most 
favorable to defendant rather than that presented in opposition 
by the State," his claim necessarily fails. State v. Howell, 649 
P.2d 91, 97 (Utah 1982). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
conviction for one count of aggravated assault, a third degree 
felony. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 7 day of February, 2004. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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